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In the Supreme Court
of the State of lJtah
.JUNE SINGLETON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs
GEORGF~

V. ALEXANDER and

"WILLIAM J. GREEN, a copartnership
dllJ!a Carefree Laundry.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries resulting
from paintiff slipping and falling in defendants place
of business known as Carefree Laundry.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants motion for summary judgment dismis8ing case granted and Court found as a matter of
law plaintiff was ''contributorily negligent" and defendants were not negligent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff 8eeks reversal of judgment dismissing
[Jlaintiff'8 ca8e, and judgment in her favor as a matter
of law, or that failing, remanding case to lower Court
for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about N ovemher 14, 19G3, plaintiff entered
the Self-Service Laundromat owned by the defendants
at the corner of 25th Street and .Monroe Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah. This was the first time she had been in
the Laundromat (Deposition, Page 4, Lines 13 and 14.)
She entered the prerni~.;es with her clothes in a clothes
basket, and in company with her daughter (Deposition,
Page 5, Lines 16 and 17), and according to plaintiff
between 11 :00 o'clock A.M., and 1 :00 o'clock P.M. on
the 14th, (Deposition, Page 6, Line 30, and Page 7,
Lines 1, 2, 5). Plaintiff indicated that at the time she
entered the premises she noticed a small area with water
on it to the South part of the building near the restroom and office floors; that it looked like just a little
spill 1 not even two feet round (Deposition, Page 12, Lines
9 through 30). This area was not near the pathway
taken by plaintiff from the time she entered the premises until she left (Defendants Exhibit No. 1).
After plaintiff had dried her clothes she folded
the same, put them in the basket, and lt~ft the premises
by the same route that she had entered the same. As
she made a turn to the right, turning toward the door,
she suddenly felt water on her feet, and before she
could do anything about it slipped and fell, causing
the injuries complained of. (Deposition, Page 9, Lines
22-26; Page 16, Lines 1 to 30. See also defendants
Exhibit No. 1).
The plaintiff further testified that the water covered
so much of the t'tore front that she could not walk out
without going 1ltrough thi:.;, as slw determined later
2

(See Deposition, Page 20, Lines 21-25. She also testified (Deposition p. 20, Lines 18 through 24) that water
was running out the door by the time the police arrived.
The Plaintiff also stated that she was looking ahead
as she was walking out of the Laundromat (See
Deposition, Page 22, Lines 10 through 23). She also
explained that the reason she was not paying strict
attention to where her feet were being placed was that
she had gone over this floor just a few minutes earlier
an the floor was dry. She also explained that she
had the basket in her arms, a circumstance reasonably foreseeable by any opemtor of a Laundromat.
Plaintiff testified further that a drain existed very near
the water. (Deposition, Page 11, Lines 8-11).
The affidavit of Wilma Alexander admits that the
premises were left unattended for a period of time during which the accident occurred. (Defendant's Affidavit, Page 4). The Affidavit alleges that it is not
customary in the self-service laundry business for the
premises to be attended at all times. (Defendant's Affidavit, Page 4). Mrs. Alexander also stated in her
Affidavit that leaving the premises unattended was
justifiable in light of the fact that the premises had a
telephone with her number listed on a card near it.
(Defendant's Affidavit, Page 6). Yet, in the Answers
to Interrogatories submitted by defendant, it was aamitted that there was no telephone on the premises on
November 14, 1963. (Answers to Interrogatories No.
14).
Nothing has been introduced by the defendant to
rfo;pute that the floor was covered with water, nor has
defendant introduced any information that the water on
3

the floor was being properly eliminated by the drain
installed on defendant's premises. Defendant's Affidavit (Page 8) states that Mrs. Alexander discovered
that the toilet had overflowed but defendant has introduced no evidence that the over-flow from this toilet
had caused or even that it was capable of causing, the
extensive inundation which existed on the premises.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED REJEcrrING PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT THE CASE FELL
WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
With respect to plaintiff's contention that the Complaint is one involving Res Ipsa Loquitur, the Court
should be advised that the wording used in the Complaint
is the same wording basically as the case of W clch vs.
Sears Roebcck Company, 96 CA. 2d 553, 215 Pac. 2d 796.
In the Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise
a presumption or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of defendant.
The conclusion to be drawn from the cases as to
what constitutes the rule of Res Ipsa Loquitur is that
proof that the thing which caused the injury to the plaintiff was under the control and management of the defendant, and the occurence was such as in the ordinary
course of things would not happen, if those who had
its control or management used proper care, together,
afford sufficient evidence, or as stated by some Courts
4

reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from, or was caused by
the defendants' want of care. See 38Am. Jur. Negligence, Sec. 295, P. 989. It has been held that the phrase
"Res Ipsa Loquitur" as a symbol for the rule that the
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances may permit an inference of
culpability on the part of the defendant, makes plaintiff's a prima facie case, and presents a question of fact
for the defendant to meet with an explanation. The
facts in the instant case are that plaintiff came into
the premises owned by the defendants, and under the
control of the defendants, and when leaving stepped in
water from an unknown source, and under circumstances
that ordinarily do not exist. She has no way of determining where the water came from and what care had
been exercised in preventing this water from being on
the floor. In her inert condition she is not to be expected to inspect the premis·es immediately and attempt
to determine what caused the situation. In 38 Am. Jur.,
Negligence, Sec. 297, P. 993, the Rule is stated further as
follows: "In a situation to which Res Ipsa Loquitur, as
a distinctive rule applies, there is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, at least none of sufficient probative value to show negligence apart from the postulate,
which rests on common experience and not on the specific
ci reumstance:s of the instant case, that physical causes
of the kind which produced the accident in question
do not ordinarilyy exist in the absence of negligence,
that is, in the absence of a breach of duty, such as defendant owed plaintiff."
In Section 299 under the same citation, the text
5

further 8tates ''Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine is based,
in part, upon the theory that the defom1ant in eharge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows
the cause of the acci<lent, or has best opportunity of
ascertaining it, and that plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence
in general terms, and to rely upon proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence."
In the case at bar plaintiff was a business invitee
to defendant's Laundromat. The Laundromat was suddenly inundated, and the water was not eliminated by
the drainage system in the establishment. This set
of circumstances does not ordinarily exist in the absenre
of negligence in the installation and manitenance of the
plumbing and drainage system. 'rhese circumstances
were a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The
plumbing and drainage systems of defendants' establishment were entirely in the control of defendants, and
therefore defendants are in the best position to ascertain the cause of the inundation and the failure of the
drain properly to eliminate the problem. Plaintiff has
no knowledge as to the plumbing in defendants' establishment and therefore is eornpelled to allege negligence in general terms. Upon this set of facts plaintiff submits that the dostrine of Res I spa Loquitur applies.
If that doctrine applies, then the Court below erred
in granting a summary judgment based upon a finding
that defendants were not negligent. Once the doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur obtains, it then becomes the defendant's burden to refute a presumption of negligence.
We submit that that burden could not be sustained
6

merely by submission of an affidavit of defendant's belief that the negligence was caused by over-flow from
a toilet stuffed with paper by an unknown person. But,
in the case at bar no such affidavit has even been presented. Defendant's affidavit merely states that the
toilet over-flowed through no fault of the management,
and supplies no causal connection between that overflow and the extensive flooding of the premises. n
does not even state the affiant's belief that there was
such a causal connection. Supplying such a causal connection is a jury function, and as the suit now stands
there is no evidence at all bearing upon this issue.
The Res Ispa Loquitur doctrine has been applied
in a number of cases similar to the instant case. See
Knowles vs. Hillside Lounge, Inc., 137 NW 2d 361, a
Nebraska case in 1965, where a collapsing stool or chair
was held to be a Res Ipsa Loquitur situation.
See Bell & Koch, Inc. vs. Stanley, 375 SW. 2d 696,
a Kentucky case in 1964; a stack of dry-wall materials
fell upon plaintiff, and plaintiff testified he did nothing
to cause the sheets to fall. Doctrine applied. See Barca
vs. Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc., 256 NYS 2d. 14, a
Supreme Court decision in New York in 1965, where the
Court held that the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applied, in the case where a supermarket customer fell on
loose sugar in the isle. The Court went on further to
~tate that the use of Res Ipsa Loquitur is not foreclosed
by plaintiff's having pleaded a specific act of negligence. See Sanone vs. J. C. Penney Co., 404 Pac. 2d 248,
a Utah case in 1965, where the Court affirmed a jury
verdict for plaintiff, and stated that Res Ipsa Loquitur
7

applied to plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff, a two and onehalf-year-old girl caught her foot in an escalator while
descending with her mother. For similar cases see 66
ALR 2d. 496.

It is our contention that Res Loquitur does in fact
apply in the instant case where plaintiff came upon
the premises and encountered a situation not ordinarily
anticipated in such a location. The premises were owned
and operated by defendants, and under their control
and as stated hereinabove, plaintiff had no method of
determining the source of the water and had no reason
to anticipate that water would suddenly flood over a
large part of the floor of the Laundromat. An affidavit
certainly could not be held to constitute legal evidence
binding upon the Court and plaintiff, that the water
came from any certain spot and that the defendants were
not negligent in the maintenance of the premises; and
in the case at bar the affidavit of defendant does not
even go so far as to allege these items.
The Rule is that it is the duty of a store owner to
use reasonable care, ordinary or due care, to make and
keep the premises reasonably safe for business invitees
to use; 162 ALR. 950 et seq. This is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AS A
MATTER O:B1 LAW DE.FENDANTS WERE NOT
NEGLIGENT.
Plaintiff contends that the depositions and affidavits befon'\ the Court establish two bases upon which
8

a jury might find defendants negligent: First, defendants admit that their establishment was left unattended,
but contend that this was the custom for those engaged
in the business of running a Laundromat. Plaintiff
submits that merely stating this in an affidavit does not
establish it as so. It is an opinion of a defendant who
is not established, by affidavit or otherwise, as having
the appropriate expertise to render a competent opinion on this matter; nor has plaintiff had the opportunity, through voir dire, to test the affiant's expertise.
But even if it were established that this was a standard
procedure in the Laundromat business, a jury need not
conclude that such a business custom met the standard of
care which a business man owes a business invitee;
See Ramsey v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co.,
251 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Pa. 1966 and Calligan v. City
of Monongahela, 115 Atl. 869 (Pa. 1922).
The second basis upon which a jury might find the
defendants negligent lies in the construction and maintenance of the plumbing and drainage system of the
premises.
Plaintiff has contended in her first argument that
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur should work to allow
the establishment of a prima facie case that defendants
were negligent in this regard. But even if that doctrine
does not so operate, plaintiff submits that enough probative evidence could be adduced to support such a contention. First, the bathroom had no drain. Second,
the drain in the main room did not eliminate the hazard
even though the water coursed by it. Third, the Depo-

9

sition (Page 15, Line 5) indicates that evidence exists
which would lead to the conclusion that the water came
from the plumbing beneath the toilet instead of, or in
addition to, the water which came from an over-flow.
Each of these items, if proved, would be a proper basis
for a jury to find the defendants negligent in the construction or maintenance of the premises. Against
these items defendants have introduced evidence only
that the toilet bowl was clogged and had overflowed.
They have offered no evidence that this over-flow created the extensive hazard which caused plaintiff's inJUry.
Many recent cases have determined the more enlightened view concerning negligence.
See New
man vs. United States, 248 F. Supp. 699 a DC case in
1965, where plaintiff fell in a hole in a walkway leading away from Washington ~Ionument. Evidence indicated that a water line beneath the walkway had been
negligently installed, and that water was leaking out
around joint causing a sudden collapse of the ground
under the walkway. Held: Award judgment to plaintiff.
Negligent installation of pipe was proximate cause of
accident. See Robinson vs. Parkcent Apts., 248 Federal
Supplement, 632. In this case the hotel had a crew of
men clearing away the snow from the approach to the
hotel. At 9 :45 P.M., the work stopped. When plaintiff
arrived shortly after midnight he slipped and fell on
glare ice covering sidewalk and path. It was held in
this matter that the award to plaintiff was proper, and
the Court stated that it was negligent to stop work that
had continued all day, and to take no precaution for late
arrivals.

10

See Control Hardware Company vs. Statler, 180
So. 2d. 205, a Florida Appellate case, 1965' were the
defendant store owner placed a mat on a sidewalk in
front of store, and plaintiff tripped on it and fell. Held:
Affirming jury verdict for plaintiff. Where abutting
owner creates a servitude on sidewalk he has a duty to
servitude from becoming a nuisance. This would be
analogous to the present case, where either the improper
installation or condition of the toilet, or the failure to
place a drain in the bathroom would be enough to create a servitude for it to be negligent.
See Moore vs. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 173, So. 2d
603, a Mississippi case, 1965, where there was evidence of
presence of dried banana peel on said Supermarket
floor, despite floor inspection two hours earlier ;Held:
that the evidence raised submissible issues for the jury
as to the defendant's negligence. See also Guidani vs.
Cumerlato, 207 NE 2d 1, Illinois Appellate case, 1965.
A foreign substance was on the floor case, where the
bowler in a Bowling Alley went to the restroom and his
shoes got wet as the floor was wet. When he returned
to bowling his shoes stuck to the floor, and he fell. The
Court here held it was error to grant defendants judgment n.o.v., after verdict for plaintiff.
The Court in this case said the defendant was under
duty "to prevent their patrons from getting liquid substance on the soles of their shoes." A case almost exactly in point with the present case.
See Harvey Building, Inc. vs. Haley, 175 So. 2d.
780, a Florida case in 1965, where the plaintiff upon
entering the lobby of defendant's office building during
rain, slipped and fell on slick floor; held reversing
11

Summary Judgment for defendant, Affidavits of plaintiff's witnesses that floor was wet and slippery, and
that plaintiff was observed on the floor sufficient fo
raise submissible issue as to occupier's negligence. See
also Murphy vs. El Dorado Bowling, Inc., 407 Pac.
57, Arizona Appellate case, 1965. The premises in this
case was shown by the evidence to have a walkway
adjacent to the last lane, which was lower than the
lane. and the bowler watching his ball, started to take
a step with his left foot, slipped over the drop-off
causing him to fall and break his leg; held reversing
directed verdict for defendant; jury could properly
find that recesssed walkway constituted negligence on
the part of the bowling alley operator. The mere fact
that condition of premises is open and obvious, does
not necessarily mean that condition is not unreasonably dangerous. Occupier may be liable to his invitees
for harm from "open and obvious conditions, where he
should anticipate harm despite his knowledge .of obviousness." In this case before the Bar defendants claim
that plaintiff should have seen the open and obvious
danger from the water, even though she was carrying
a basket customarily which in some way blocked her
view. The case is further in point with our present
case, i. e., the Court held the jury could find the condition of the premises was such that negligence could
be found, and this, of course, is plaintiff's contention in
the present case before the Court, that the maintenance
of the bathroom was such that negligence could be found
by the jury.

za.

See also, G. E. vs. Salcidio, 408 P. 2d 42, an Arizona
Appellate case in 1965: In this case the Court found the
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plaintiff does not have to prove actual or constructive
notice of defective floor condition, where defect is created by defendant or his servants. Once again this is
a analogous to the case before the Court, where plaintiff claims that defendants noted the dangerous conditions in the bathroom, where in fact, the water was
coming up around the base of the toilet, or the fact that
no drain was presented permitted the water to come
through the remaining traversed part of the Laundromat.
See also, 6lALR. 2d 62, Harper & James Torts,
1073-75; 1487, 1488: See Prossor Torts 402, 3d Ed.
1964. See Garrett vs. American Air Lines, Inc. 332 Fed.
2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964). Plaintiff was injured when she
stumbled over a small zipper bag put on the floor near a
gate in the waiting room and sued the air carrier for negligance in not providing a safe place for passengers to
wait. In reversing a directed verdict for defendant,
the Court held it is a submissible issue for the jury to
determine whether air carrier must anticipate liklihood that the manner in which passengers handle hand
baggage would cause injury to fellow passengers. The
Court stated that a carrier must reasonably take cognizance of the customs and habits and practices followed generally by its passengers insofar as these actions present hazards to its business invitees, and with
awareness of these hazards it must take reasonably appropriate steps to avoid or minimize liklihood of harm.
This would be applicable in the present case, where a
jury must determine whether or not customers would
be carrying baskets, which might hamper their vision,
and whether the customers would be likely to use the
13

bathroom in such a manner as to cause the toilet to
over-flow, and with this in mind the defendants would
then be under the care to take reasonable steps to avoid
any dangerous condition.
Along the same line, with respect to the owner's
liability to anticipate acts of third parties, see Denisewich vs. Pappas 198 A. 2d 144, a Rhode Island case
in 1964; the plaintiffs' rt>staurant patrons, were injured
when a car operated in defendant-restaurant's parking
lot broke through the wall of the restaurant adjacent
to the booth. There was no adequate barrier between
the parking lot, and the building. The Court here heia
that it was a question of fact whether the defendant was
under a duty to erect adequate barrier. The Court
stated that where a third person's intervening act could
have been first seen or anticipated as natural and probable result of the original negligence, the chain of
causation was not broken, and applying this Rule to
our present case, the jury could find that defendants
have, or should have fors0en or anticipated the public use of toilet facilities, and possibly flooding of the
same, if this in fact did occur. See Bozza vs. Varnado,
Inc., 43 N.J. 355, 200 A. 2d 777, a New Jersey case in
1964, where plaintiff fell on a cafeteria floor, and proved
that the defendant was very busy, supplied no lids on
beverage containers, did not require the use of trays,
and the floor was littered, which circumstances, according to the Court, were held to make that a prima facie
case, and stated that when plaintiff's circumstances
were such as to create rPasonable probility that a
dangerous condition would occur he need not prove
occupier's actual or constructive notice thereof. The
14

Court further held: "Concept of actual or constructive
notice has been given undue emphasis in our decision."
The case of Mahoney vs. J. C. Penney Company,
377 Pac. 2d., 663, a New Mexico case decided in 1962,
found likewise, where plaintiff fell down on the stairway of the store, the Court held that plaintiff's recovery
was warranted though proof of actual, or constructive
knowledge was absent, and that actual or constructive
knowledge of specific foreign substance or length of
time it was present need not be proved where dangerous
condition is not isolated, but is foreseeable because of
pattern of conduct, recurring, general condition, or
continuing condition. Once again this is analogous to
the case before this Court, where the condition of the
plumbing and drainage system was such that the injury
or conditions causing the injury were reasonably foreseeable.
In 38 Am. Jur. Sec. 30, P. 677, the Rule is stated as
follows:
"The standard by which the conduct of a person
in a particular situation is judged in determining whether he was negligent, is the care which
an ordinary prudent person would exercise under
like circumstances."
and this particular rule, ordinarily, is to be followed
by a jury determining the presence or lack of negligence or contributory negligence, but is not a question
of law.
POINT III.
rl1HE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AS
A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGFJNT.

15

Plaintiff contends that defendants knew or should
know in the ordinary course of business, customers are
going to come into the store carrying containers and
oftentimes large baskets of clothing, and that this factor
is one that must be considered in using reasonable care
to provide reasonably safe premises for such traffic.
Indeed, the business of the defendants relies upon customers entering and leaving with large bundles in their
arms. With this jn mind, plaintiff submits there can
be no question but what we have a jury question as to
whether or not defendants had the premises in such a
condition as it would reasonably require for the safety
of its patrons, and the further question as to whether
or not plaintiff was using reasonable care in her ingress and egress from the building. In this case, the
Court cannot say, without the taking of evidence, t~at
either one of the parties, plaintiff or defendants, were
not negligent as a matter of law. See Kreiss vs. Altuna
Laundry, Inc. 133 So. 2d 602, a Georgia case, 1963,
where the Court held; "Whether it was reasonable for
plaintiff to use the only method of egress from flat
under the circumstances, and whether she was reasonably careful was for the jury to determine." This is
where the plaintiff left the premises, testifying, "It was
pitch-black" and where the plaintiff had previously traversed the area. See also Safeway Stores, Inc. vs. Stephens. 197 A. 2d 849, a 1964 case of Washington, D. C.
Appellate Court, where the Court held; "Plaintiff was
not necessarjly negligent in stepping through debris.
Whether she was exercising a degree of care commensurate with the known circumstances was a question upon
which reasonable minds could disagree. Therefore, a
jury question was presented." In this ease, plaintiff
16

admittedly was in a hurry because the store was about
to close, and walked across the isle, knowing vetetable
debris was on a dirty floor. See also Dever vs. Theriot's,
Inc., 159 So. 2d 602, a Louisiana case in 1964, where
the plaintiff-customer fell on lettuce, the Court held that
the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence,
and it not necessary to make a specific observation of
floor conditions before taking each step. See also Gargaro Foley vs. Salesianurn School, Inc., 208 A. 2d. 308,
Deleware Supreme Court Case, 1965, where the Court
held that plaintiff could not be said to be guilty of
contributory negligence, or assumption of risk, as a
matter of law, where question existed as to her appreciation of degree of risk under poor lighting conditions.
In this case, plaintiff slipped and fell in a school parking
lot after leaving school, where she had been playing
bingo. Plaintjff had been at school about once a week
for a year and knew of mounds and poor lighting. See
Robinson vs. Parkcent Apts., 248 Federal Supplement
632, DDC., 1965. In this case defendant had a crew of
men clearing away snow on the approach to the hotel.
At 9 :45 P.M. the work stopped. When plaintiff arrived
shortly after Midnight he slipped and fell on glare ice
covering a sidewalk and pa th. Held: A warding judgment to plaintiff. It was negligent to stop work that
had continued all day, and to take no precautions for
late arrivals. Plaintiff was not under duty as a matter
of law to look at street before leaving the taxi, and not
guilty of contributory negligence in stepping onto icy
walk. Since plaintiff required to use both public sidewalk and path to reach hotel, hotel would be liable
whether fall occurred on sidewalk or hotel property.

17

See Blackburn vs. T01nbling, 407 Pac. 2d. 337, a Colorado case, in 1965, where the hotel door swung outward immediately on to a four and one-half inch step,
plaintiff who had just entered the hotel, went hack
out and fell down over step; held a verdict for plaintiff, evidence supported finding that a person in exercise of due care could fail to observe step down.
The case cited by defendants in support of their
contributory negligence allegation, are, as is obvious,
old cases, not in point, and at the present time not
good law. The Courts have recently all indicated that
a question of negligence, and contributory negligence
are questions of ultimate fact, which should be determined by the jury, after all available evidence is
sumbitted to it.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS AND
AGAINST PLAINTIFF A11 TIME OF PRE-TRIAL.
With respect to Summary Judgments, our Supreme
Court of Utah, in the case of Brandt vs. Springville
Banking Coniz)any, 10 Utah 2d., 350, 353 Pac. 2d 460, held
that a Summary Judgment prevents litigants from
fully presenting their ease to the Court; Courts are
and should be reluctant to invoke this remedy.
In a further case, Bidlack vs. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 Pac. 2d. 559, 561, the
Court stated:
"A Summary .Judgment must be supported by
evidence, admi~sions, and inferences which when
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viewed in the light most favorable to the loser
show that, 'there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and that the losing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law'."
The Court went on further to say;
"Such showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain
a judgment in his favor."
Under these rulings plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to present evidence to show that defendants were negligent since nothing has been adduced or
offered by defendants to indicate that plaintiff could
not sustain her burden of proof. Questions of fact remain unanswered. What eaused the hazard¥ Why
was it not eliminated by the drain~ Should there have
been a drain in the bathroom~ Were the defendants
justified in leaving their premises unattended¥ Nothing indicates that these questions, and others, could not
be reasonably answered in plaintiff's favor at the trial,
and the record indicates the availability of evidence
which supports plaintiff's allegations.
In the rase of Lundlil?rtJ vs. Bachman, 9 Utah 2d.
58, 337 Pac. 2d. 433, the Court held that as against
general allegations of negligence contained in the Complaint, the facts set out in affidavits cannot be constrned as totally superseding the pleadings. This would
~eem to be good law; the defendant cannot disprove
plaintiff's allegations, and all of the necessary allegations merely from affidavits where there is no opportunity for examination of the affiant, and where there
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are other possibilities not gone into, or brought forth.
rrhe mere fact that an affiant states that she did examine the premises within thirty minutes prior to the
accident, and that they were perfectly normal, and that
some unknown person came in and stuffed the toilet is
not sufficient evidence to disprove any allegation of
negligence or to prevent plaintiff from cross-examining as to whether or not the facts stated in the affidavit
were in fact true.
Thus, even if the affidavit were consistent with all the
other evidence, it should not totally supercede the pleadings. But in the case at bar the affidavit is not consistent either with the evidence of plaintiff or with
the other evidence provided by the def cndants themselves. Two inconsistencies are apparent: First, in
their Answer to Interrogatories defendants admit that
there was no telephone on their premises on the day
of the accident. The affidavit contradicts this admission, and thereby creates doubt about its credibility,.
Second, the Deposition shows the existence of a very
large amount of water on the floor. Defendant's affidavit suggests (but does not allege) that the only water
on the floor of the premises was that which over-flowed
from the flushing of a toilet. Other inconsistencies
might develop where the affiant is cross-examined; and
when conflicts and inconsistencies exist in evidence a
jury should resolve them. As the Court stated rn
Carter vs. Parker, 183 So. 2d. 3, (Fla. App. 1966);
''Extreme caution should be exercised in granting Summary .J udgrnents in negligence cases,
since the issue of negligence is ordinarily a jury
question."
20

The law governing Summary Judgment cannot be
that a party may, by affidavit, swear that he was not
negligent, and by affidavit state that the opposing
p:uty was negligent, and have the Court accept this as
competent, binding evidence. Nor should the law governing Summary Judgments force litigants to try their
cases by affidavit before presenting them to a jury.
Plaintiff concludes that under the Statutes of Utah
and under the laws pointed out in recent court decisions, Judgment should be granted to Plaintiff on the
pleadings and the case remanded to the Lower Court
for a determination of amount of damages, or this
failing, reversing judgment of Lower Court and remanding this case to the Lower Court for trial.
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